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ABSTRACT: I elucidate Heidegger’s understanding of the “place-being” 
of the “question of being.” My premises are: 1) Heidegger’s “question 
of being” can be appropriately made sense of as the “question of lan-
guage.” 2) The “question of language” requires a topological approach 
that looks into the link between the place-nature of language and the 
open-bounded essence of human existence. First, I explain the topologi-
cal underpinnings of Heidegger’s later thought of being as the clearing 
and language; second, I examine Sheehan’s phenomenological read-
ing of Heidegger by focusing on the relationship between alētheia and 
appropriation (Ereignis). In the first section, I explain the correlation 
between place and language within the context of the “question of 
being” and display how understanding the former is crucial in hav-
ing a more complete perspective for the latter. In the second section, I 
examine Sheehan’s acknowledgment of Heidegger’s idea of place (topos) 
in his understanding of the nature of human existence in relation to 
Ereignis, while criticizing the “metaphorical” reading of the “place-
being” of the clearing.
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With Being and Time . . . the “question of Being” . . . 
concerns the question of being qua being. It becomes 
thematic in Being and Time under the name of “the 
question of the meaning [Sinn] of being.” Later this for-
mulation was given up in favour of that of “the ques-
tion of the truth of being,” and finally in favour of that 
of “the question concerning the place [Ort] or location 
of being” [Ortschaft des Seins], from which the name 
topology of being arose [Topologie des Seins]. Three 
terms which succeed one another and at the same 
time indicate three steps along the way of thinking. 
MEANING – TRUTH – PLACE [topos]. If the question 
of being is supposed to become clarified, what binds to-
gether the three successive formulations must necessar-
ily be disclosed, along with what distinguishes them. 
“Seminar in Le Thor 1968” (ga  15: 344/fs  47) 
In order to counter this mistaken conception and to re-
tain the meaning of “project” [Entwurf ] as it is to be 
taken (that of the opening disclosure), the thinking af-
ter Being and Time replaced the expression “meaning of 
being” with “truth of being.” And, in order to avoid any 
falsification of the sense of truth, in order to exclude its 
being understood as correctness, “truth of being” was 
explained by “location of being” [Ortschaft] – truth as 
locality [Örtlichkeit] of being. This already presupposes, 
however, an understanding of the place-being of place.  
“Seminar in Le Thor 1968” (ga  15: 335/fs  41)
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I . WHEREFORE TOPOLOGY? 
Without a doubt, Heidegger’s thought concerns itself with “being” 
(Sein), yet there is still much confusion as to what to understand from 
this philosophically loaded concept. Heidegger’s own obscure use of the 
word “being,” a point that he acknowledged in the 1950s (ga  12: 105, 
112/owl  20, 26), reflects the inherent difficulties of attempting to un-
derstand the core issue of “being.” We will all remember Heidegger’s 
opening reminder in Being and Time via Plato’s Sophist. Perhaps owing 
to this general difficulty, Heidegger’s way into the Seinsfrage did not al-
ways stay the same from the mid 1910s up until 1976, as Heidegger took 
up different paths in order to illuminate the question of “being.” Nev-
ertheless, it was for him the fundamental issue of thinking. One way 
of approaching Heidegger’s idea of “being” is to take up the question of 
language, and this is not a matter of philosophical taste, but an attempt 
of returning to where we already find ourselves in thinking, which 
concerns the essence and the ground of hermeneutic phenomenology. 
 The question of language was always in the background of Hei-
degger’s thought. It was already a concern for him as early as in the 
1915 dissertation “Duns Scotus’ Doctrine of Categories and Theory of 
Meaning,” the 1921 course Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression 
(ga  59), section 34 in Being and Time, and the 1934 lecture course 
Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language (ga  38) (see 
ga  12: 86–9/owl  6–8). After the mid 1930s and onwards, however, the 
issue started to appear on its own terms. Insofar as the final issue of 
Heidegger’s philosophy turned out to be what he called the “topology 
of being,” understanding the place from which we can trace how both 
“meaning” (Sinn) and “un-concealment” (alētheia) co-determine one 
another as relevant concepts and steps in Heidegger’s investigations into 
the “question of being” is crucial. Here when I mention “topology,” it 
simply refers to the philosophical study of space and place on herme-
neutic grounds. When I use the word “topological,” I mean the kind 
of approach that thinks in terms of place. The expressions “place-being 
and “place-nature” are various translations of the German Örtlichkeit. 
Thus, when I concern myself with “topology of language,” I imply 
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the place-oriented, onto-ethical and hermeneutic investigation of our 
experience of being and dwelling in and with language. As such, what 
follows is an attempt to rethink Heidegger’s understanding of “being” 
via the notions of “place” and “language,” and specifically to point out 
how language appears as the place of human experience. Engaging 
with the “place-being” of Heidegger’s question of language can provide 
a new perspective for bringing into closer view the very core issues of 
the “question of being” and problematizing the very ground of herme-
neutic phenomenology.
 The following passage from Heidegger and his Japanese colleague 
Professor Tezuka’s partly fictitious dialogue (1953/54) can help us situ-
ate the “question of being” in its proper context in Heidegger’s later 
thought:
I: It did, however, become the occasion for very great con-
fusion, a confusion grounded in the matter itself and 
linked with the use of the name “Being.” For this name 
belongs, after all, to the patrimony of the language of 
metaphysics […]
J: The fact that this dispute has not yet got onto the right 
track is owing – among many other motives – in the 
main to the confusion that your ambiguous use of the 
word “Being’’ has created.
I: You are right: only, the insidious thing is that the confu-
sion which has been occasioned is afterward ascribed to 
my own thinking attempt, an attempt which on its own 
way knows with full clarity the difference between 
“Being’’ as “the Being of beings,” and “Being” as “Be-
ing” in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of 
its truth (the clearing).
J: Why did you not surrender the word “Being” immedi-
ately and resolutely to the exclusive use of the language 
of metaphysics? Why did you not at once give its own 
name to what you were searching for, by way of the 
nature of Time, as the “sense of Being”?
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I: How is one to give a name to what he is still searching 
for? To assign the naming word is, after all, what con-
stitutes finding (ga  12: 103–4/owl  19–20).
Accordingly:
1) “Being,” in the sense of the “being/substance of beings,” is a 
word of metaphysics, which has its original place in the history 
of ontology between Plato-Nietzsche. This is not the understand-
ing of “being” that is the main Sache of Heidegger’s thought. 
Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly writes, “being only remains 
the provisional word” (ga  7: 234/egt  78).
2) “Being” (in the sense of the “clearing,” the open) is Heidegger’s 
own contribution to the question of “being,” which is the main 
Sache of Heidegger’s thought. Thus it is possible to abandon the 
word “being,” and simply employ the “clearing” (Lichtung). 
Of course, the fact that “being remains the provisional word” does not 
mean that our issue is no longer about “being,” just as it does not mean 
that only the word “being” is appropriate in problematizing the issue 
of being. Yet, we must not disregard or underestimate the fact that Hei-
degger views the “clearing,” which is apparently a place-related term, 
as a word that hints at a non-metaphysical way of thinking that can 
help us better grasp what is at stake. This is why a topological inquiry is 
suitable to delineate what “being” comes to mean for Heidegger, since 
the promise of topology is not to cling to various sorts of subjectivism 
or metaphysics, but to explicate the situated nature of human existence 
and its horizonal being.
 First it will be useful to specify a few important implications of 
Heidegger’s “topology of being.” Otto Pöggeler was one of the first 
in Heidegger scholarship who used the term “topology” in relation 
to Heidegger’s thought.1 Joseph Fell is another important figure who 
investigated the ontological sense of place in Heidegger’s thought of 
being.2 Of course, there are many other important figures, such as Ed-
ward Relph and Stuart Elden, whose works offer careful examinations 
of Heidegger’s idea of space, place and dwelling in different registers. 
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Nonetheless, in the most recent scholarship, a comprehensive under-
standing of “topology of being” has been fostered by Edward Casey, 
and especially by Jeff Malpas, whose works on space and place offer 
the most encompassing explorations and interpretations of Heidegger’s 
place-oriented thought.3 In a nutshell, Malpas suggests that topology 
(as a composite of Greek topos and logos) can be understood as the kind 
of endeavor that looks into the “saying” and “gathering” that ontologi-
cally connects human beings to the place in which the experience of 
the world emerges.4 Malpas argues, “The happening of world occurs 
first in the calling of language, in the gathering of the thing, in the 
opening up of the time-space that is also the ‘taking-place’ of place.”5 
Indeed, philosophical topology appears as a hermeneutic project that 
investigates the very emergence of the sense of things in the world from 
our “emplaced” situation. In that sense, topology can also be seen as a 
hermeneutic way of making use of phenomenology, since it is concerned 
with examining the very “relation” between the part and the whole 
and their dynamic interaction, as this relation must always be grasped 
as a “situated” one. In that regard, one of the crucial tasks of philosophi-
cal topology is to show the hermeneutical underpinnings of the essence 
of the human existence in place.6
 In general, the idea of place that is at issue here concerns the onto-
logical situation (or situatedness) of the human being as the human be-
ing vis-à-vis the presencing (Anwesen) of phenomena. This ontological 
“situated-ness” implies that the human being opens up to the world in 
experiencing phenomena in and of place. Here we must distinguish at 
least three correlated senses of place in Heidegger’s thought: 
1) Place (topos, Ort, Ortschaft; but also die Lichtung) as the “open-
bounded” clearing within which the experience of the world 
emerges for the finite human being. It is open, because it is 
where one goes beyond oneself, opening up to the world, yet at 
the same time it is bounded, since the openness that is at issue is 
not an infinite one, but one that is horizonally determined. The 
openness of place which allows one to move in a certain field or 
region also demarcates the limits of this movement. Thus, being 
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in place means being open to the world while being delimited 
by the conditions and circumstances to which one belongs which 
constitute the horizon of the clearing at issue.
2) Place as a locality or a site within which things are gathered, dis-
closed and inter-connected in their distinctiveness. For instance, 
the fourfold (Geviert) is an example of such an understanding 
of site or locality where distinct entities (or regions) of the same 
world co-determine one another by constituting the same con-
text of referentiality or inter-relationality. 
3) Ontic, “real” place(s) or locations (Plätze, Stelle) in space: for in-
stance, Germany, Athens, Heidegger’s hut in the Black Forest, 
the classroom, the drawer in which we find the hammer. 
 When we think of place, we usually think of the third, ontic desig-
nation of it. However, we must not forget that these “real” and precise 
places and locations are possible for human experience as the places that 
they are if and only if the two former dimensions are already disclosed. 
This threefold understanding of place, as well as the correspondent 
terminology that Heidegger employed, are by no means consistent, as 
they vary depending on the context and different periods of Heidegger’s 
thought. A more detailed understanding of the particular relationship 
among topos, Ort, Ortschaft, Stelle, Platz (as well as Aufenthalt) requires 
its own systematic study, which is beyond the limits of this essay. Un-
less stated otherwise, the notion of place that concerns my argument 
here refers to the first one, that is, place as the “open-bounded,” which 
indicates the topological essence of the clearing. 
 Let us here briefly put the historical development of Heidegger’s 
explicit topological thinking in context. 1) Heidegger already had in 
mind a sophisticated idea of the “place-being” of the human existence 
via the conception of Dasein in Being and Time. The essence of exis-
tence is its being-in-the-world, always being emplaced in a particu-
lar world-situation. 2) In the period between 1934 and 1942 (marked 
by the Germania and the Rhine lecture course and The Ister lecture 
course) Heidegger started to thematize his notion of place qua place 
via the notions of Ortschaft/Ort, however still without a well-defined 
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understanding of these terms in relation to the question of being. When 
engaging with Heidegger’s philosophy from the mid 1930s and 1940s, 
we must not forget that in this transitional phase of his thought Hei-
degger incorporated nationalistic elements in his thinking of “place,” 
being influenced by the romanticist and nationalist ideas of the populist 
völkisch movement, which gained much popularity in Nazi Germany. 
Before he abandoned this approach, he attempted to engage with the 
“political” dwelling of a particular “people” in a particular region via 
his interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry, whose success is very disputable. 
However, he eventually came to see that such an engagement with 
“place” in nationalistic terms could play no role within the framework 
of the “question of being.” 3) As Heidegger delved deeper into the place-
nature (Örtlichkeit) of “language,” which became explicit for the first 
time in the “Letter On Humanism” with the statement that “language 
is the house of being,” it was clear that the primary question was the 
“dwelling” of human existence, and not the dwelling of Germans or a 
particular people. In that regard, the shift from mere Ort and Ortschaft 
to Örtlichkeit signifies a very important development in Heidegger’s un-
derstanding of the issue of place, which is a transformation that is most 
remarkably noted in the essays included in On the Way to Language. 
This is why the ideas of the “place-being” of the clearing and language 
are bound together.7 After the mid 1940s and early 1950s and onward, 
first he turned to a poetic idea of dwelling (wohnen) via the notion of 
the fourfold (Geviert), which can be seen as an elaboration of his proj-
ect of the topology of being. Later on, Heidegger’s explicit concentra-
tion on the question of dwelling, and the link between appropriation 
(Ereignis) and the essence of language (sagen as saying), brought him 
to his mature Topologie des Seins.8 In that vein of thinking, when we 
are considering the “place-being” of language, the very world-forming 
nature of language is our concern, and not the disclosure of a certain 
worldview via language. That means that Heidegger’s later notion of 
language ventures to explore the nature of the primordial dwelling 
place of human existence in which the “being” of phenomena appears. 
For the later Heidegger, language as Sprache is the region of human 
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existence where the acts of language, such as listening, speaking, com-
municating, understanding, interpreting and remaining silent, appear. 
Being more than a mere sum total of these acts of language, language 
is essentially where the human being is brought back to its mortal es-
sence. This broad existential understanding of language took a more 
concrete form when it came to be designated as the “house of being.” 
Within that context, it will be useful to consider what Heidegger writes 
in the Letter on Humanism:
The reference in Being and Time (p. 54) to “being-in” 
as “dwelling” is not some etymological play. The same 
reference in the 1936 essay on Hölderlin’s word, “Full 
of merit, yet poetically, man dwells upon this earth,” is 
not the adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from 
science by means of poetry. The talk about the house 
of being is not the transfer of the image “house” onto 
being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of 
being in a way appropriate to its matter, more readily 
be able to think what “house” and “dwelling” are. (ga 
9: 358/272).
This passage shows the basis for, and one of the most explicit expres-
sions of, Heidegger’s appeal to a topological mode of thinking that must 
acknowledge place and place-related notions without disregarding them 
as “metaphors” or “symbols.” In that regard, the notion of “language” 
(Sprache) figures in three interrelated senses, which can be taken to 
correspond to the threefold understanding of place: 
1)  Language as the open-bounded place (the human being’s dwell-
ing-place, i.e., the house that belongs to the clearing) in which 
any phenomenon can meaningfully appear as the phenomenon 
that it is. This is where the human being’s encountering of the 
meaningful presencing of phenomena in and from stillness 
(Stille) takes place through listening and hearkening. When I 
am using the word “language” as such without further explica-
tion, it is always this first sense of language that I am employing. 
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2)  Language as the discursive movement in and through which 
the human being brings words (Worte) from stillness into the 
sounded words (Wörter). This is where the poetic actions of lan-
guage such as “naming” (nennen) and “saying” (sagen) happen. 
3)  Language as spoken languages such as English, Greek, and 
Chinese. This is the ontic sense of language that we are most 
accustomed to in our everyday experience, where written or 
oral communication, self-expression and such transpire via the 
articulation (Verlautbarung) of sounds associated with meaning. 
The third dimension of language is dependent on the availabil-
ity of the first two, while the former two can show themselves 
only through the third. In that sense perhaps we could even add 
a fourth sense of “language” as Rede/logos, which is the simul-
taneous taking place of these three registers of language, though 
Heidegger dropped the notion of Rede in his later thought, and 
explained the essential matter of language with “saying.” 
I have argued that language is the place in which the essence of human 
existence is brought back its proper dwelling place, where humans are 
capable of finding a relation to their mortal essence. Let me unpack 
this idea. In On the Way to Language, in specifying human existence’s 
relation to the manifestation of phenomena, Heidegger makes use of 
the notion of Ereignis in a quite particular way.9 As Heidegger admits 
himself, in Being and Time he “ventured too far and too early” with 
the question of language (ga  12: 89/owl  7); thus we can argue that the 
full implications of appropriation as the movement in and of language 
did not appear in the 1920s. In the essay “The Way to Language,” Hei-
degger brings into view the meaning of “way-making movement” (Be-
wëgung) by drawing on this word from the Swabian-Alemannic dialect 
of German to elucidate the relationship between the clearing and what 
becomes apparent in/to the clearing. Expounding on the “appropria-
tion” of language, Heidegger puts forward the etymological connection 
between “way” (Weg) and movement (Bewegung). The word Be-wëgung 
signifies a way that clears up the field and indicates the very sense of 
movement that opens up space (ga  12: 249–50/owl  129–30). In other 
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words, “movement” is the happening of the “way” which shows forth 
the openness, namely the clearing. For Heidegger, “saying” amounts to 
the act of moving in and with language, which opens up the way (the 
way that extends between the thing and its sense) to bring the mean-
ingful manifestation of phenomena into words while also disclosing the 
boundaries of the clearing itself. “The way-making of Saying into spo-
ken language is the delivering bond [das entbindende Band] that binds 
by appropriating” (ga  12: 251/owl  131). Words (Worte), though, do not 
amount to the mere agreement of vocal sounds and signs. In fact, words 
emerge from the stillness (Stille) of language, as our saying traverses 
the site of meaningfulness via the act of speaking, being delivered to 
the sounded words (Wörter). Words arise from the stillness of language 
because all authentic saying first listens and hearkens before it comes to 
“speak.” In that, words belong to the region of the stillness (Stille), not 
in the sense of mere muteness, but in the sense of the tranquil openness 
of listening and hearing, where responding can arise as a possibility in 
the first place. 
 With the experience of the openness of stillness, which constitutes 
the boundary of meaningfulness, the “way-making” of the clearing 
becomes apparent. The “way-making” constitutes the two-fold rela-
tion between the clearing (the essence of “being”) and the way in and 
through which the being of beings occurs (ga  12: 112/owl  26). As such, 
Heidegger looks into our experience of language, which for him occurs 
from the clearing in “ringing stillness” (ga  12: 241/owl  121–22). The 
correspondence (Ent-sprechung) between stillness and signs takes place 
via saying, that is, by our “naming” the words. This brings to the fore 
the space and spacing in and by which we traverse the open expanse of 
the interval. The way-making movement (Be-wëgung) that appropriates 
and situates the human existence in its proper place is the core issue of 
language (ga  12: 249/owl  129). 
 In Heidegger’s thought, human beings fulfill their humanness in 
saying. Without language, the world in which we exist would never 
come to touch us, for we would be deprived of the “being” of things. 
What makes us the kind of beings that we are is precisely our openness 
to understanding things in their being. For instance, when I learn the 
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meaning of the word “flower” in a different language-world, its sense 
hints at the source of a distinct experience of the “being” of flowers. 
For example, while we are used to thinking the concept of “language” 
via words such as glossa, lingua, language, tongue, for the Japanese it 
can also come to mean the blossoming of the petals of plum or cherry 
flowers from stillness, as the word koto ba indicates according to Hei-
degger’s own interpretation (ga  12: 134/owl  45). Here we must be 
careful. What primarily concerns us is not some particular “meaning” 
(Bedeutung) of language that we have now discovered and whether it 
“really” means the “blossomming of the petals of plum or cherry flow-
ers,” as if this meaning could be a linguistically “verified” definition by 
a native speaker. Of course, this does not imply changing or interpret-
ing the common sense of words at will, and we must admit that some 
of Heidegger’s re-constructive attemps with ancient Greek, or in this 
case with Japanese, can be read as bold interpretations that force the 
boundaries of linguistic sensibility. Nevertheless, the chief aim remains 
to reconsider our relation to words by giving them room, letting them 
“take place,” so that new meanings or new interpretations can emerge. 
As such, what allows us to experience language is not the dictionary 
meaning, or even the so-called poetic sense of a word that we learn, 
but the way of language that leads us to the disclosure of the fact that 
signs can never exhaust the meaning (Bedeutung) of the phenomena 
that they signify, which only hearkening to the word can help us find 
out. Following the traces that language leaves on the path of thinking 
would be undergoing a poetic experience with language, in the sense of 
going along with it. Words are doomed to “fail” (ver-sagen) every sin-
gle time they are said. However, human beings are bound to continue 
searching for new ways of “saying” and coming to an understanding 
of things, since this is how they “exist.” This is where we find the true 
sense of language as the clearing, as well as the “house of being.”
 Language is where we always find ourselves as the kind of be-
ings we are, where our relation to the existential situation to which we 
belong comes to appear. This characteristic of language is concealed 
in everyday speech, where language is used as an instrument of com-
munication. We simply overlook the ways in which we “dwell” because 
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it is so near and we are so “accustomed” to language that it escapes our 
attention. Thus we must take seriously the hermeneutic implications 
of the correlativity (which is established in and of language) between 
entities that are meaningfully present and the horizon of understand-
ing within which entities emerge. This is why Heidegger calls lan-
guage (as world-moving saying) “the relation of all relations” (ga  12: 
203/owl  107). In a certain sense, without maintaining language, we 
would have no “relation” to the clearing, meaning that there would 
be no experience of things as things to be experienced. Language, as 
the appropriated place of existence, provides room for the gathering in 
which things and the world open up to one another in a meaningful 
way, long before language comes to mean mere speech that gets com-
municated via dictionary-words, concepts and other linguistic processes 
of signification. In other words, in and with language, we find the first 
possibility of “sensing” things not as neutral, irrelevant objects, but as 
things that matter to us.
I I . READING SHEEHAN TOPOLOGICALLY
In this section what I want to achieve is to include Sheehan in my 
ongoing discussion of Heidegger’s topology of being and language 
by inquiring into the topological underpinnings of his phenomenol-
ogy.10 Although at first one might not think of Sheehan as a topologi-
cal writer, his hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of Heidegger 
could be read as a topological inquiry that asks concerning the place 
in which human experience of the world occurs, which is nothing but 
Heidegger’s  “question of being” as the clearing. In Sheehan’s account 
or in general, we should not understand topology simply as a certain 
type of phenomenology. Insofar as topology is an engagement with 
the “place” and “place-being” of human existence, it sits at the very 
core of the phenomenological project in determining the correlation 
between the understanding of human beings and the way in which 
phenomena meaningfully appear. Nonetheless, the topological aspects 
of his accounts may remain implicit to the reader that does not think 
in place-related terms. In that vein of thought, the very significance 
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of Sheehan’s phenomenological interpretation comes to the fore in a 
much clearer way with a topological mode of thinking. Dealing with 
Sheehan’s account in this way can show us what the primary and fi-
nal matters of Heidegger’s phenomenological project were, namely the 
question of language and the clearing.11 Lack of attention to the cor-
relativity of “meaning” and “place” results in interpretations that lose 
track of Heidegger’s original and final philosophical concerns. The fact 
that Heidegger’s thought moves from meaning to truth to place, and 
that place is the last step of his line of thinking, makes it equally im-
portant to inquire where Sheehan’s account stands within the context 
of the meaning–truth–place trifold that Heidegger highlights in the 
Le Thor seminars. 
 Sheehan’s comprehensive analysis of Heidegger is extremely im-
portant mainly due to its precision in highlighting the existential situ-
atedness of Da-sein in making sense of things. Of course, what is at 
issue here is an inquiry into the way in and through which phenomena 
appear to mortals. Sheehan convincingly makes his case that the ques-
tion of “being” is not a question concerning some sort of a deity, a meta-
physical beyond, or a driving force or energy of nature. It is a question 
concerning the correlation between phenomena and the mode of exis-
tence for which there are something like phenomena in the first place. 
In light of Heidegger’s indications, Sheehan makes the important dis-
tinction between “being as beingness” (Sein as Seiendheit) and “being” 
that refers to the clearing. The former notion of “being” signifies the 
account of “being” as substance that was never the issue of Heidegger’s 
thought, while the latter indicates the site of the correlativity of human 
existence and the un-concealment of phenomena.12 Thus Sheehan sug-
gests that the Ur-phänomen of Heidegger’s thought was die Lichtung, 
namely the “opened clearing” (or the “world of meaning”) that makes 
space for the appearance of the sense of things (msh 20). The conception 
of the clearing in Sheehan’s account is the primary topological thought, 
which remains implicit and thus needs to be explicated. 
 According to Sheehan, the hermeneutic sense-making capacity of 
the human existence is the source of the understanding of the realness 
of things. In the history of western philosophy, various names have 
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been assigned to the ground and essence of all that exists, such as idea, 
ousia, God, absolute mind, will, will to power, etc., which has been the 
kind of approach that Heidegger sought to fix. Yet, Heidegger’s main 
issue was not putting forward a theory concerning the ground (as the 
foundation) of things “out there,” but rather bringing into view the “is-
ness” of “is.” In other words, Heidegger’s thought is about the source of 
the existential conditions of the intelligibility of phenomena, which is 
accessible to our understanding through the phenomenological mode of 
inquiry, as phenomenology is an investigation of “relations” (msh  10). 
 A particularly important example of what I consider Sheehan’s 
implicit topology can be found in his comparison of early and late Hei-
degger: “His earlier work stressed ex-sistence insofar as its thrownness 
has always already opened up the clearing and holds it open (Da-sein), 
whereas his later work stressed the clearing as held open by thrown-
open ex-sistence (Da-sein)” (msh  22). The second proposition means: 
the human being does not make the open, but maintains its openness. 
In other words, without human existence, which Heidegger famously 
calls the “shepherd of being,” the openness in and from which the real-
ness of things can issue would remain undisclosed and unintelligible. 
Sheehan here underlines the word Da (there), which he takes as the 
“openness” or the “clearing” within which the sense of things appears 
for the human understanding. He writes:
In Heidegger’s telling, the correlativity of man and 
being has long been known to philosophy. However, 
the open space (Lichtung) which makes such correla-
tion possible, as well as the opening up (Lichten) of that 
space – or better, its ever-openedness (thrown-openness) 
– has long been overlooked by metaphysics because of 
the intrinsic hiddenness of that openness. (msh  158)
Here what I take to be the topological vein in Sheehan’s reading be-
comes all the more clear. He claims that the “sought-for” of Heidegger’s 
thought is not only the whence of beings, but the “whence and how is 
there the open” (msh  69) that is, Ereignis. In other words, Heidegger 
asks concerning the site of this manifestation by bringing to the fore 
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the astonishing fact that things are accessible to us as meaningful 
things. Our access to the meaningful presence of things is a result of 
our appropriated (er-eignet) existence as the openness of the “being” of 
phenomena. This is the meaning of Da as the always already cleared-
openness, which defines the essence of the human being. Without the 
Da (the clearing) that the human being maintains, there is no disclo-
sure of the Sein des Seienden (the Greek on, or the being of beings). In 
other words, the Sein of things occurs only in cases where Da is avail-
able, open, that is, when it is appropriately sustained. What Heidegger 
called the “oblivion of being” (Seinsvergessenheit) in Being and Time in 
fact could be renamed as the “oblivion of appropriation” (Lichtungsver-
gessenheit or Ereignissesvergessenheit) (msh  259), which also indicates 
the oblivion of the place-nature of the issue. Hence Sheehan asserts that 
“being” as the clearing denotes “disclosedness-to-understanding,” and 
the key point in Heidegger’s thought is that he problematizes the site 
from which the “presencing” of meaningfulness arises.
 Sheehan understands the situated nature of the human existence 
as thrownness (Geworfenheit), in light of early Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Da-sein is thrown (pro-jected) into its future possibilities of existence, 
always ahead of itself in the world. “The open” signifies the “always-
already opened up space” (msh  20), which is the disclosedness of the 
intelligibility of things and its accessibility for human experience. 
Secondly, without the “thrown” nature of the human being’s situated-
ness in the world, which also signifies the finite essence of the human 
existence, there would be no relation to that open site (because in each 
and every case the human being finds itself “bound” to the “there”). 
There is neither an agency nor a natural power that literally “throws” 
the human being into the world from a mysterious “yonder,” but the 
human being finds itself in the world, “thrown” into a particular his-
tory, society, and geography, that is, always emplaced into its own situa-
tion. Accordingly, for Sheehan Ereignis and Geworfenheit amount to the 
same thing, since appropriation is precisely what designates the taking 
place of the proper situation of the human existence.
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 Sheehan explains the “taking place” of appropriation in six points 
(msh  20), where the first and the third points specifically concern us:
1. To think or act dis-cursively entails “running back 
and forth” (dis-currere) between the thing and its 
meaning, or the tool and the task, as we check out 
whether this thing actually does have that meaning 
or whether in fact this tool is suitable for that task. (…)
3. But we can think and act discursively only by meta-
phorically “traversing the open space” between the tool 
and the task, or the thing and its possible meaning. 
(msh  21)
Here two notions need to be addressed: a) discurrere in the sense of 
“running back and forth between” and b) “traversing the open space,” 
and its so-called “metaphorical” essence. Here what we first find is 
another hint that appeals to us to think the place-nature of “being” (the 
occurrence of the clearing), as the idea of “traversing” that Sheehan 
draws on links up the issue with the phenomenon of “relation” and 
“between-ness.” When topologically thought, that which is “traversed” 
must be situated between the two “ends,” which means that the act of 
traversing takes places in the “between.” We know that in Heidegger’s 
thought the idea of “the between” (das Zwischen) is particularly crucial 
in thinking the essence of hermeneutics.13 The between is not some 
empty space that stretches between two “points” in space, but two oppo-
sites or ends which appear as regions insofar as the middle space relates 
them to one another, by letting them co-exist in the same expanse. 
In other words, it allows them to constitute a whole, namely an inter-
relational site of presencing in which things can emerge and remain 
correlated. This means that that which “the between” connects cannot 
be thought as mere presences, but rather as relations. As such, “the 
between” is not a mere space of empty passage, but rather a recurrent 
emergence, for it establishes the correlating movement between things 
by providing the required space and the spacing for them. Therefore 
“space” always implies “spacing” in its essence (Wesen) and essencing 
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(Wesung), in the sense of the “opening up” of space. Put differently, 
the essence of space (Raum), namely spacing, occurs as space making 
(einräumen).
 Sheehan’s understanding of Ereignis is tied to his reading of alētheia 
as the un-concealment of phenomena, which Heidegger temporarily 
called the “truth of being” in the 1930s and 1940s, although he aban-
doned this designation in the 1950s. The notion is central to Heidegger’s 
philosophy, since it served as the bridge from “meaning” to “place.” 
First, let us look to Sheehan’s trifold explanation of alētheia:
Alētheia-3: The correctness of a statement, namely the correspon-
dence of intellect and thing.
Alētheia-2: The pre-propositional meaningfulness, as the disclosed-
ness of things.
Alētheia-1: The “un-disclosed” open place of the thrown-open. 
Sheehan claims that it is Alētheia-1, as the occurrence of the open region 
of meaningfulness, that makes possible 2) the pre-propositional avail-
ability of the unfolding of things as (true or false) things to understand-
ing, and 3) the apophantic correctness of things. Without the taking 
place of the openness in which the sense of things can be gathered and 
disclosed, the correctness of our representations could not even become 
a matter of thought. What nevertheless must be noted is that the open-
ness that is at issue does not indicate some sort of “infinite openness,” 
but a finite one bounded by the limits of the human existence. This 
also means that human existence marks the “limit” of Alētheia-1, just 
as Alētheia-1 de-fines and de-limits that field of human existence. The 
finite nature of human existence (as mortals or being-towards-death) 
is bound to the “place-being” of the manifestation of phenomena. Ac-
cording to this scheme of thought, Alētheia-1 is the most fundamen-
tal instance of un-concealment, indicating the “open space” in which 
the individual human being can take things “as” something in their 
meaningful presence (msh  74–75). I suggest that Alētheia-1 can be 
taken to mean the “occurrence of the clearing,” indicating the gath-
eredness of the two sides of the interplay between the “to-which” and 
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the “from-which.” Un-concealment always occurs in and of place for 
the kind of being that maintains this openness. Therefore, the question 
concerning the clearing is about the opening up of the “region” (Geg-
net), which encompasses the two-way movement and encountering of 
the disclosure of phenomena and the “thrown-open” human existence.
 From this we can infer that the human being is essentially a 
“placed” being, “thrown” into the world as the “open-bounded.” It is 
“finite” in that it is moving towards its own death through the present 
moment, yet the utmost possibility of existence within the limits of its 
being-there is “open,” as Da-sein exists futurally as “e-ject.” If so, it 
follows that appropriation situates the correlation between Da and Sein 
into its proper site. At issue is neither Dasein nor Dasein, but rather 
Da<–>sein, which is one of the reasons why after the Beiträge the notion 
almost always appears hyphenated.14 Appropriation signifies both the 
place (world) and the taking place of the disclosure of the “being” of 
phenomena in their mutual, gathered and two-way movement. Things 
appear meaningfully via the appropriating movement, that is, appro-
priation that makes space for the back-and-forth movement between the 
Da <–> Sein, finitude and openness. Here “<–>” can be taken to be the 
mark of the appropriating movement that arises in the “thrown-open.” 
The happening of appropriation transforms the appropriated clearing 
so that it becomes the open-bounded in and by which the disclosure of 
phenomena can occur and be gathered. In this way, human existence 
can become itself (its own/proper), that is, the openness that it is via the 
appropriating movement. 
 Sheehan states that the open (the world, the clearing, topos) is 
the discursive space where existence takes place (msh  103). In other 
words, we “sustain the space within which the discursive understand-
ing of things can take place” (msh  104). As I have mentioned earlier, 
I consider this space that we sustain language. Sheehan does not dis-
cuss the topic of language qua language (or the idea of dwelling) in 
his major work.15 Nonetheless, there are a few instances where Shee-
han touches on the relation between logos and alētheia (msh  xviii), 
which indicates an equivalence between Alētheia-1,2,3 and Logos-1,2,3. 
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Without Alētheia-1 and Logos-1, there would be no language as dis-
course or speech, which means that the world would never come to the 
fore as the world. Sheehan remarks that for Heidegger Rede (speech, 
discourse) does not mean the correspondence of meaning with sounds 
or the linguistic system of signification-communication (msh  150), 
arguing that in Being and Time worldly “ex-sistence” (the essence 
of Dasein) and logos amount to the same thing. I interpret this as 
follows: in existing, that to which we first respond as the meaning-
ful occurrence of the clearing is language. Within the boundaries 
of this primary sense of language, our everyday spoken languages 
appear. In other words, language as the open-bounded is the site in 
which human beings can “be made to remain” (sistere) and comport 
themselves to the disclosure of phenomena from and out of (ex) their 
particular “place.” Without it, they would remain captivated in their 
own subjectivity, not being able to open up to the world and thus not 
encounter the opening up of the world. 
 The core issue of Heidegger’s thought is the emergence of the inter-
relation between that which becomes manifest (phenomena) and the 
openness that can make sense of this manifestation (Dasein), in the 
very site as which appropriation takes place (language). This threefold 
interrelation is precisely what constitutes the basis of Heidegger’s “ques-
tion of being” as the clearing. “Being” implicates the very gatheredness 
of these three distinct elements. Thus the core matter of Heidegger’s 
later thought, i.e., the clearing, is possible only if the openness that is 
at issue is appropriated in and with and as Alētheia-1 (or Logos-1). For 
Sheehan, this means that the human being does not remain open to 
the clearing as if the clearing is some other space (msh  24). It is an 
opening that emerges where we always already are. The essence of the 
human existence and “being” are not two different “beings” that are 
connected by an external bridge (language), precisely because “being” 
is not just an entity (Seiendes) or a metaphysical life force (such as God) 
simply out there. In turn, in order for an understanding of “being” to 
exist so that we can thematize its “meaning” and “disclosure,” there 
needs to be the open-bounded place (Ortschaft, topos) from which such 
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an understanding can emerge. This place is where the origin of the 
“ontological difference” is groundlessly grounded in that we can dis-
tinguish “being” from “beings,” just as we can distinguish what grows 
in a field from the field itself. For the later Heidegger, Ereignis is not 
just another name either for “being” or the individual human being. 
Ereignis is what belongs to the existential structure of the understand-
ing of being, a place of gathering where the possibility of differentiat-
ing phenomena from the site of disclosedness in which they appear 
(alētheia) occurs. This is why the clearing and language point to the 
same open-boundedness in their distinctness.
 I hope to have shown thus far how and why I proposed to read Shee-
han topologically, and why Sheehan’s phenomenological interpretation of 
Heidegger is a very cohesive one due to its receptivity of the topological 
Heidegger. Nonetheless, as is the case in most studies on Heidegger, even 
though Sheehan examines notions such as “field,” topos, “openness,” 
“clearing,” “the thrown-open clearing,” “the open region of understand-
ing,” and “the realm of disclosedness in relation to site of meaningful-
ness” (msh xviii, 9, 12, 20, 92), he does not explicitly ask why Heidegger 
sought to explain the matters by such space- and place-related notions. 
For Sheehan, the focus always remains on meaningfulness, but not so 
much on the “place-being” of place. One of the reasons why Sheehan 
does not pay close attention to the place-nature of Ereignis on its own 
accord is related to the fact he considers the “place-being” of the clear-
ing a metaphor. To say the least, this is in contrast with Heidegger’s own 
understanding of metaphors, especially considering Heidegger’s study 
of Hölderlin’s poetry in the Ister lectures (ga 53: 17–32/16–27). Sheehan 
writes, “Metaphorically speaking, as thrown-open (i.e., appropriated), 
human being is the ‘open space’ or clearing within which the meaningful 
presence of things can occur. (The previous sentence is Heidegger’s phi-
losophy in a nutshell.)” (msh 15). Sheehan indicates that the human being 
is not the source of appropriation, but it is that which is appropriated and 
brought to its proper place. This is certainly true, yet this is also why the 
matter must be investigated beyond a simple metaphor-literal dualism. 
Asking whether the clearing at issue is a “real” clearing in a “real” forest 
or not would imply that our thinking of the issue is still influenced by 
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the viewpoint of Platonist meta-physics, one that divorces the ideal from 
the real, the sensuous from the non-sensuous. According to this account, 
the so-called ontological clearing exists only in our conceptions, yet the 
clearing in the woods is the “real” phenomenon. Connecting the two by 
means of an analogy indicates that we are transferring the image of the 
latter onto the former. However, this is not how Heidegger understands 
the clearing, which is related to his idea of language. 
 Since Heidegger does not see language as a “rule governed sys-
tem of signification,” words cannot be considered as mere signals that 
signify objects in the world that correspond to the signifier. The main 
function of words is to bring the meaning of the signified into discourse 
in and from silence by saying it. Since words can never simply exhaust 
the meaning of a phenomenon, they must be seen as the hints of what-
ever phenomenon that we are trying to think, interpret, and name. Just 
as the idea of the “house of being” is not an image of the conception of 
language (ga  12: 107, 111–12/owl  22, 26), the image of the clearing in 
the woods is not a spatial symbol of alētheia either. Alētheia is not an 
objectively present fact in the “real world” “represented” by the image 
of the clearing, or the “open space” in the woods, attached to it post 
facto. Likewise, we should consider the sign “the clearing” a beckoning. 
It hints at the occurrence of spacing and lighting that is at issue with 
alētheia and that requires our naming and saying in language. We are 
not simply “connecting” the clearing as “being” with a clearing in a 
forest by means of “signs” in our minds: they already beckon us to the 
same matter, that is, the same “occurrence,” before we can ever come 
to re-connect them with the help of an analogy. In the essay Why Poets 
Heidegger writes: 
If we go to the fountain, if we go through the woods, 
we are already going through the word “fountain,” 
through the word “woods,” even if we are not saying 
these words aloud or have any thoughts about language. 
(ga  5: 310–11/232–33)
In that sense, considering the space- and place-related notions that Hei-
degger employs in his philosophy as mere metaphors is simply incom-
patible with Heidegger’s idea of language, just as it is incompatible with 
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a phenomenological reading of Heidegger, since our openness to lan-
guage is where things appear to us as things. The metaphorical reading 
of the clearing opens up the question as to how we are to speak or think 
without these so-called “metaphors.”16 If expressions such as “the open 
region” and “the openedness” are metaphorical, then what can we say 
about Ereignis, Existenz, alētheia, Da-sein, Entwurf ? Subsequently we 
could suggest that language itself is a pool of metaphors all the way 
down, since words are never sensible objects (ga  12: 122/owl  35), but 
this is precisely the metaphysical notion of language that Heidegger 
criticizes. For Heidegger, language is not a tool, just as a house is not 
one, because the issue of language concerns our openness to saying, just 
as a house indicates the place from which we are opened to the world. 
Language is the open-bounded place (topos) of meaningfulness (Sinn-
lichkeit/Bedeutsamkeit) from which the particular meanings of things 
(Sinn/Bedeutung) appear. Being open to language is where the essence 
of being human resides, just as fishness requires being in the water. 
Even the idea that language may not be our primary dwelling place or 
that we could “make sense” of things themselves without language is 
a sense that only we experience in and of language.17
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